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Introduction
When, at the end of the nineteenth century, the French extended their infuence into the 
mountainous regions of northern Laos, the areas where opium poppies had been grown 
for many decades then fell within the French colonial territory of Indochina. Hmong and 
Yao  opium poppy cultivation was offcially tolerated  on condition that, after satisfying 
domestic  consumption,  any  surplus  production  would  be  delivered  to  the  French 
authorities.
In fact, the French decrees were not enforced: instead, most of the surplus supplied local 
and regional smuggling activities, while at the same time the French showed little interest 
in  systematically  acquiring  Laotian  produce.  Notwithstanding  demand  for  the  raw 
material by the opium factory in Saigon, the Douanes & Régies (department of Customs and 
State Monopolies) hesitated for a long time before considering any purchase of  opium 
from Laos.1 The director of this administration summed up the reasons for this in 1903: 
By buying 12  piculs of opium [720 kg], we remove that quantity from the smuggling 
scene, but we also encourage production in those regions too remote for us to supervise. 
One possible consequence is that, in the following year, we might be forced to purchase 
the entire crop produced by the Meos [Hmong] at the high price which they have come 
to expect from us, in order to prevent them engaging in contraband activities that we 
will have helped them to develop.2
The absence of any real control  by the colonial power over the areas of cultivation, 
coupled  with  the  high  price  that  the  producers  demanded  for  their  crop,  incited  the 
Douanes & Régies to favor the purchase of raw opium from foreign sources. This opium 
was both easier of access and available on a regular basis at a fxed price. However, the  
French colonial administration was forced to modify this policy due to the outbreak of 
serious disturbances among the Huaphan,  the Muong Hou, and the population of the 
Black River basin from 1914 to 1916.3 Chinese smugglers were blamed for these events, to 
which  the  colonial  authorities  reacted  by  launching  a  systematic  campaign  for  the 
purchase of Laotian opium in order to suppress contraband traffc. In December 1915, the 
Governor General, Ernest Roume, instructed the  Douanes & Régies to take all necessary 
measures  to  ensure  that  the  indigenous  production  of  opium  was  acquired  “at  a 
suffciently generous price to discourage farmers from withholding any of the crop to sell 
to  Chinese  buyers”.  Roume added:  “I  attach the  greatest  importance  to  resolving this 
problem as quickly as possible,  since, under the present circumstances political reasons 
must take precedence over all other considerations”.4 
The purchasing campaigns decided in December 1915 could not be put into practice 
until the following year, but from 1917 to 1924 they apparently resulted in the acquisition 
of 81 tonnes of raw opium.5 This total conceals wide variations ranging from 274 kg (in 
1922) to 32 tonnes (in 1923). The scandal that came to light at the end of the 1925 campaign 
partly  explains  the  reasons  for  these  fuctuations,  and  why,  in  the  best  years,  the 
authorities bought quantities of opium far in excess of the production capacity of Laos.6 It 
also  brought  to  light  the  corrupt  purchasing  practices  and  dysfunctional  state  of  the 
colonial civil service. Furthermore, these political repercussions were the source of marked 
tensions between the Indochinese and metropolitan authorities. 
In this essay, a mainly narrative approach has been adopted in describing the events 
that took place. Starting with the fraud, of which the  Douanes & Régies department was 
victim,  colonial  sources  reveal  details  of  the  developing  scandal,  culminating  in  the 
political  epilogue  of  the  whole  affair  before  the  Senate  of  the  French  Republic.  This 
approach enables us to follow the rhythm of revelations that progressively disclosed the 
poorly organized opium purchasing campaigns, not to mention the bureaucratic strategies 
employed to hide or cover up the scandal. 
The discovery of a “veritable fraud”
The fasco surrounding the 1925 opium purchasing campaign was predictable, if not in 
its  magnitude,  at  least  in  its  form.  In  the  previous  year,  the  chief  of  Luang  Prabang 
province  had  reported  the  arrival  in  Laos  of  huge  quantities  of  raw  opium,  and  the 
Douanes & Régies had also discovered a consignment of adulterated drug.7 However, apart 
from canceling the permit  to  purchase opium of  one  of  the  authorized merchants  (an 
indigenous trader), no action was taken to prevent a repetition of similar dealings in 1925. 
On the contrary, negligence and ineptitude further aggravated the situation. 
On September 24, the opium factory in Saigon reported a frst evaluation of the batches 
offcially designated as sub-standard after analysis, involving 500 chests, totaling about 22 
tonnes of raw opium valued at 473,765 piastres.8 At that time, neither the full extent of the 
fraud, nor the probable fnancial loss had been fully assessed, since not all the chests had 
been systematically analyzed. Nevertheless, the director of the  Douanes & Régies,  Marie-
Alphonse Kircher, was suffciently aware of the inevitable scandal that he informed the 
Governor General of the problems at the beginning of October. In anticipation of the full 
results  of  the  analyses,  he  estimated  that  the  entire  22  tonnes  of  raw  opium  were 
“absolutely unusable” due to the presence of substances, such as clay, sand, gravel, waste 
vegetable matter and even excrement, that had been fraudulently added “in considerable 
quantities”. 
It was consequently at this stage that, for the frst time, Kircher used the appropriate 
term to describe the opium purchasing campaign: a “veritable fraud”.9 Administrative 
and judicial inquiries were immediately set up in order to determine the circumstances of 
the unprecedented fasco and to ascertain who was responsible. 
The inspector of the Douanes & Régies for Laos was entrusted to carry out the internal 
inquiry  that  began  in  December  1925.10 It  focused  on  the  delivery  conditions  and 
formalities  at  the  offce  of  his  department  in  Luang  Prabang,  and  on  the  respective 
responsibilities of the local inspector and of the main supplier of the opium. 
The internal inquiry
Evidence given by the local  inspector,  François  Giton,  describes the very superfcial 
controls carried out on delivery of the drug. Deliveries took place in the presence of the 
supplier,  the  inspector,  the  indigenous secretary,  and the  indigenous  employees  of  the 
bureau des Douanes & Régies. The only test designed to ascertain the quality of the opium 
consisted of a practical smoking of selected batches by one of the employees “usually a 
smoker”.  As  he  commented favorably  on each of  the  several  pipes  he  smoked,  Giton 
concluded that the whole consignment was of good quality. The local inspector tactlessly 
remarked  that  the  “taster”  had  even  “made  himself  ill  by  smoking  more  than  was 
habitual”,11 without apparently realizing that this observation could just as easily be taken 
as a contradiction of his judgement concerning the good quality of the opium, rather than 
a comment on the assiduity of the smoker. Unaware of the ambiguity of his remark, Giton 
was then confronted with the analyses of  the opium factory,  whereupon he expressed 
surprise at the content of the report since the drug had been tasted, and he himself “had 
put his fnger in the boiled opium and tasted it out of curiosity” without noticing anything 
in particular.12 In other words, the local inspector showed as much naivety in his replies 
to questions  as he did in applying quality control procedures to the deliveries  of  raw 
opium. 
The second Frenchman questioned by the investigator was the local representative of 
the Maison Saint Germain, offcial buyer and main supplier to the Opium Regie. From the 
beginning of the purchasing campaigns, the colonial administration had bought very little 
opium at source, and instead mostly delegated the task of acquiring the drug at its source 
of  production  to interested parties  in  the  private  sphere.13 In  the  provinces  of  Luang 
Prabang and Upper Mekong, the Maison Saint Germain dominated the market as the main 
purchaser of raw opium, and was the supplier that delivered 20 of the 22 tonnes to Luang 
Prabang in 1925. The nephew of the director, locally responsible for the company, proved 
to be as incompetent and lacking in experience as the local inspector. One passage of the 
report of the inquiry shows this particularly well. 
When  questioned  about  his  ability  to  distinguish  good  quality  opium  from  an 
adulterated  sample,  an  indigenous  employee  of  the  company  assured  that  he  was 
incapable  of  perceiving  the  difference.  Confronted  with  this  statement  his  employer 
exclaimed “It's  impossible”.  It  was  not  only  possible  but  perfectly  normal.  In  fact  the 
indigenous employee had replied to a very precise question, namely: was he capable of 
identifying “opium mixed with resin or with fruit juice?”.14 His negative reply indicated a 
thorough appreciation of the diffculty in identifying these specifc types of substance used 
to adulterate opium, without  having recourse to a chemical analysis of the sample, or 
subjecting it to a practical test by actually smoking it. The nephew of the director of the 
Maison Saint Germain was clearly unaware of these procedures, as was the investigator 
who would have been better advised to spend time questioning the indigenous employee 
about his ability to identify the presence of gravel, sand, or excrement in raw opium. Be 
that  as  it  may,  the  reactions  of  the  French supplier  clearly  demonstrated  his  abysmal 
ignorance  of  the  the  technical  aspects  of  the  enterprise  that  he  was  supposedly 
administering. The same could be said of the local inspector, who relied entirely on the 
opinions of his indigenous employees to cover up his own lack of knowledge concerning 
the  qualities  and  characteristics  of  the  raw  opium.  Both  men  were  responsible  for 
conducting transactions relating to a substance about which they knew next to nothing. 
Quite logically the report of the inquiry concluded that the local inspector at Luang 
Prabang  was  incompetent  and  incapable  of  carrying  out  his  duties  in  a  responsible 
manner. But, paradoxically, the author of the report stated that it was precisely for this 
reason that he did not recommend taking disciplinary action: nobody had questioned his  
honesty, only his naivety and incompetence. Instead, full responsibility for the fraud was 
attributed to the Maison Saint Germain. However, for inexplicable reasons, the local head of 
the company was not incriminated. Instead, he was also classifed as being incompetent  
and consequently judged to have been the victim of his indigenous employees:
The buyers working for the company were competent; they alone were responsible for 
the good and bad supplies, and if almost all the deliveries were of bad quality, it was 
they who had knowingly delivered an inferior mixture in anticipation of making an 
easy sale. Driven by the temptation of immediate proft, did they give any thought to 
the eventual dissatisfaction of the administrative authorities? Or to the consequences of 
their actions? Was it their duty to refect on these things?15
These questions, which concluded the report, tacitly implied that there were other, more 
essential  questions that the author had avoided asking,  obviously because they would 
have involved the  responsibility  of  his  own department.  To  absolve  Giton because  of 
incompetence was one thing, to absolve the Douanes & Régies was quite another. 
The judicial inquiry 
The judicial  inquiry  was entrusted to  Yves  Martin,  an investigating judge from the 
province  of  Luang  Prabang,  who,  in  July  1926,  submitted  his  report  to  the  public 
prosecutor in Hanoi. More detailed than the internal inquiry, judge Martin's investigations 
revealed new elements concerning both the strategies employed during the purchasing 
campaigns and the conditions under which the drug was fnally delivered to the Opium 
Regie. 
The frst task facing the inquiry was to establish at exactly which point in the supply 
chain  foreign  substances  were  added to  the  raw opium.  Statements  taken from Regie 
offcers suggested that the consignments of opium might have been tampered with after 
they had been bought by the Opium Regie. This hypothesis was categorically excluded by 
the judge. Once accepted by the local inspector, the consignments of opium were securely 
stored in lead-sealed chests ftted with clamps which precluded any interference, either 
during stockage in Luang Prabang, or during their transport under guard to Saigon. 
Questions  still  remained  concerning  verifcation  procedures  carried  out  in  Luang 
Prabang  which  were  found  to  be  even  more  superfcial  than  those  described  by  the 
internal inquiry. The judge discovered that they were limited to “testing samples from a 
minimal number of chests”; samples were rarely boiled, “but more often than not were 
merely  assessed  visually”.16 The  incompetence  and  criminal  negligence  of  the  local 
inspector was therefore confrmed, as well as the amateurism of the offcial buyer. Since 
the local head of the Maison Saint Germain never went in person to the opium producing 
regions,  buying  transactions  were  delegated  to  four  indigenous  “sous-acheteurs” 
(subcontractors offcially accredited by the colonial authorities), who then sub-contracted 
the task of buying to auxiliaries who supposedly negotiated purchases from growers at the 
actual  source  of  production.  Thus  the  French  supplier  knew  nothing  about  the 
consignments  delivered  to  the  Opium  Regie,  and  took  no  precautions  whatsoever  to 
personally verify the quality of the raw product contained in the chests:
Before  presenting  the  goods,  it  never  occurred  to  him to  verify,  by  even  the  most 
elementary procedure, the quality of the raw opium that was delivered. Only once did 
he take a sample to be tested before a consignment was transported to the Douanes & 
Régies.17
Apart  from  questions  pertaining  to  adulteration  of  the  drug,  the  investigation 
concentrated  on  unravelling  the  fnancial  aspects  of  the  buying  procedures.  After  the 
opium had been accepted by the local inspector, payment was effected by the operator of 
the current account of the province, either to the representative of the Maison Saint German 
or  his  secretary.  Accounts  were  then  immediately  settled  with  the  indigenous  sous-
acheteurs waiting outside the current account offce. The Opium Regie offered to pay 20 
piastres per kilo of raw opium, of which the Maison Saint Germain retroceded 19 to its four 
sous-acheteurs. According to the judge, the proft per kilo of raw opium acquired amounted 
to 1.50 piastres for the Maison Saint Germain of which 0.50 was paid to the four accredited 
sous-acheteurs,  while the remaining 18.50 were supposed to cover the cost of purchases 
made directly from the Hmong and Yao producers.
In reality, things happened quite differently. First and foremost, the raw opium was not 
locally produced, but was bought from Burmese smugglers. Unfortunately, the judge did 
not investigate further into this aspect of the affair. He restricted his observations to noting 
that both the local inspector and the offcial buyer were pertinently aware that the foreign 
drug was sold in Laos under cover of offcial  purchases,  but did not investigate more 
deeply this crucial aspect of the purchasing campaigns that accounted for the enormous 
quantities  of  raw  opium  delivered  to  Luang  Prabang.  The  judicial  investigation  was 
therefore limited to the town of Luang Prabang and basically drew the same conclusions 
as the internal inquiry: the local inspector and the offcial buyer were criticized for their  
“negligence”, but neither the one nor the other were found guilty of knowingly delivering 
an adulterated substance. The report tacitly implied that the two Frenchmen were far too 
inept to have organized a fraud on such a scale. 
Thus the offcial  buyer was exonerated from criminal  responsibility,  and the  Maison 
Saint Germain was only imputed with civil responsibility. The only guilty perpetrators of 
the “audacious fraud” were, successively, the indigenous sous-acheteurs and the producers 
of the raw opium, but for political reasons the judge decided not to proceed with criminal 
incriminations:  “that kind of inquiry would only serve to create panic,  or even revolt,  
among a population that does not yet hold us in great esteem”.18 
This line of reasoning was not without foundation in regions where the opium poppy 
was cultivated. Nevertheless, the judge omitted to state that among the Hmong and Yao 
producers in Laos, their fears were mainly based on the fact that they did not deliver all of  
their  surplus crop to the authorities.  The fact  that the inquiry had clearly revealed the 
contraband origin of the bulk of raw opium, implied that the reasons for incriminating the 
Laotian  producers  was  specious  to  say  the  least.  The  political  reasons  given  for 
interrupting the criminal inquiry at that stage in fact provided the pretext for avoiding a 
more thorough investigation of the thorny question of contraband; to probe any deeper in 
that  domaine  risked  creating  a  new  scandal,  in  addition  to  the  fraud  that  had  been 
perpetrated on the Opium Regie. 
There was clearly a desire to play down the affair, which satisfed the department of 
Douanes & Régies. In October 1926, the director sent a report to the Governor General in 
which he euphemistically summed up the conclusions of the inquiries:
The investigating offcer for the internal inquiry found that the local inspector, who was 
responsible for reception of consignment at Luang Prabang was inexperienced and had 
shown slight negligence.19
Moreover,  the  director  of  the  Douanes  &  Regies presented  his  own  version  of  the 
conclusions of the judicial inquiry by implying that the judicial authorities had counseled 
against bringing a civil action aimed at obtaining a cancellation of the sale of raw opium 
and reimbursing the sums paid to the supplier.20 He was certainly right in thinking that 
the supplier had strong arguments against canceling the sale, especially since the Opium 
Regie  had  accepted  the  produce  without  demur,  after  duly  checking  it,  however 
perfunctory the controls had been. However, it was hardly consistent to state on the other 
hand that there had been “slight negligence” by employees in his service in controlling the 
quality of the raw opium. In short, the aim of the director of the Douanes & Regies was to 
minimize serious errors committed during the purchasing campaign and bring to a rapid 
conclusion an affair that was extremely compromising for his offce.
This  strategy  collapsed in  January 1927,  when a  civil  service  offcial,  designated to 
inspect the running of the department of  Douanes & Régies, submitted a damning report 
concerning the acquisition of opium in Laos. 
The Tixier Report 
Auguste-Charles-Denis Tixier, the  Inspecteur general des Colonies appointed in 1926 to 
carry out an audit of the Douanes & Regies in Indochina, submitted a report which, for the 
frst  time,  incriminated the director  of  the department  with responsibility for  the 1925 
fasco.21
First of all, Tixier challenged the decision to entrust the task of buying goods on behalf  
of  the  civil  service  to  middlemen.  In  his  view,  the  system  of  appointing  indigenous 
accredited buyers was the main cause of the excessive purchases carried out in Laos, and 
of the infux into the country of quantities of raw opium of foreign origin, in addition to  
the “unbelievable adulteration” which characterized the 1925 campaign.22
Secondly,  Tixier  conceded that at the outset  of  the buying campaign the director of 
Douanes  &  Régies had given  “instructions”  -  the  author's  inverted  commas  -  advising 
caution  and  moderation  in  negotiating  purchases,  but  this  remark  was  intended  to 
emphasize  the  fact  that  the  advice  went  unheeded.  At  the  start  of  the  campaign,  the 
director had fxed a price of 15 piastres per kilo at Luang Prabang, but this had been 
increased to 20 piastres after the Superior Resident in Laos had commented that the 15 
piastres  offered  was  far  below  the  real  value  of  the  locally  produced  opium.  Tixier 
observed that raising the price by 5 piastres was futile, since it was still lower than the 
market  value  of  Laotian  opium,  while  at  the  same  time  it  became  more  attractive  to 
purchase opium produced in the Shan States of Burma. 
Thirdly the director of the Douanes & Régies had not acted on the advice of the inspector 
in Laos who, realizing that the local inspector in Luang Prabang was a complete novice in 
conducting buying transactions, had requested that an experienced employee from the 
opium  factory  be  seconded  to  Luang  Prabang  as  his  assistant.  As  a  result,  the 
inexperienced civil  servant had a free hand in managing the purchases,  as well  as the 
considerable  sums  of  money  involved,  without  frst  taking  the  most  elementary 
precautions in checking the quality of the consignments of raw opium. 
Fourthly, Tixier emphasized the personal responsibility of the director of the Douanes & 
Régies, Kircher, on leave until April 1925. lt was in fact during his absence that the decision 
to increase the purchase price had been taken by the acting head of the department. Yet, on 
his return Kircher omitted to take any measures whatsoever in anticipation of the looming 
problems,23 even though, as the report showed, he had the means at his disposal: the 
request  for  400,000  piastres  in  order  to  pay  for  the  purchases,  which  promised  to  be 
considerable, had been made in April,  whereas the bulk of the buying operations took 
place in May to mid June. 
The  spacing  of  the  deliveries  provided  the  fnal  element  that  contributed  to 
understanding the mechanism of the fraud. Although the buying campaign was spread 
over one and a half months, more than half the consignments, supplied by the offcially 
accredited middlemen,  were  delivered during the  last  fve  days,  during which  it  was 
impossible to carry out adequate quality controls. 
Spacing of deliveries to the Opium Regie at Luang Prabang 




1st 10 days of May 1,857 0 1,857
2nd 10 days of May 3,474 308 3,783
3rd 10 days of May 2,387 0 2,387
1st 10 days of June 1,313 1,807 3,120
11-15 June 11,558 72 11,630
 According to Tixier, Kircher was fully responsible for the fnancial losses incurred in 
1925. These amounted to 471,000 piastres. More generally, it was the purchasing policy of 
the  opium  monopoly  that  was  called  into  question:  supplies  bought  during  previous 
purchasing campaigns in Laos were deemed to be “useless”, and stocks of unsmokable 
opium had been acquired by the Opium Regie in Yunnan totaling more than 2,000,000 
piastres. In short. since Kircher had committed “serious errors” by completely neglecting 
the  management  and  control  of  certain  sectors  of  his  department,  and  authorizing 
“unjustifable” purchases under “implausible” conditions, disciplinary action should be 
taken against him.25 
In  1928,  Kircher  attempted  to  justify  his  actions,26 which,  far  from convincing  the 
inspector of colonies, clearly succeeded in irritating Tixier to such a degree that he wrote 
an additional  note  to  his  report  in  which he  denounced Kircher's  conduct  during  the 
purchasing campaigns in even stronger terms:
The organization [of  the  purchases]  was in  fagrant  contradiction of  the  contract;  it 
inevitably  incited  the  middlemen,  offcially  accredited  by  the  Douanes  &  Régies,  to 
indulge in contraband, either independently,  or in connivance with their  designated 
procurers. Everyone, including the director of the  Douanes & Régies, knew that almost 
all the raw opium that was acquired came from illegal sources, and that virtually the 
entire, indigenous, high quality Laotian opium, was purchased by the Chinese and sent 
to other destinations. M. Kircher could have immediately stopped the huge purchases 
of opium, which, for the collecting centre at Luang Prabang alone amounted to eleven 
times more than the annual consumption of all Indochina, by doing what he had done 
once  before,  namely  reducing  the  purchase  price  that  the  Superior  Resident  had 
increased in February. After all,  he was fully aware, not just following his return (in 
April 1925, or even in October of the same year), but for many years previously, that 
400,000 piastres served to fnance a huge smuggling network organized by the Burmese 
and various middlemen; it was certainly not in October 1925 that he learnt about this.27
In spite of this, the Governor General, Pierre Pasquier, reasoned that the interim director  
of the department bore greater responsibility for the errors committed than the offcially 
appointed offcer, with the result that no disciplinary action was taken against Kircher, nor 
against  any  other  employees  of  the  Douanes  & Régies.28 However,  following the  1925 
fasco, the colonial authorities did implement three measures. 
The frst involved dispensing with the offcially accredited middlemen, and in 1926, the 
purchase price of Laotian opium was reduced to 15 piastres per kilo. According to the 
Opium Regie this price was “marginally less than the market price”. In actual fact, it was 
considerably lower than the real value of the drug which, in Tran Ninh, traded at 10 to 12 
piastres for  350 grams early in 1926.29 Not surprisingly,  the  growers judged the  price 
offered to be insuffcient and declined to deliver their surplus crop to the Opium Regie.30 
Therefore, only 176 kg were received, an amount that was infnitely less than the 3,500 kg 
allowed by the colonial authorities. 
The second measure  concerned  a  civil  action instituted in  January 1927 against  the 
Compagnie coloniale du Laos -in other words the former  Maison Saint Germain. A writ was 
served on the company to cancel the 1925 sale of opium and reimburse the price paid by 
the  administration  for  deliveries  of  defective  consignments.  Tixier  had  few  illusions 
concerning the outcome of this case, since the investigating magistrate had dismissed the 
case for lack of evidence of fraud. 
The third measure consisted of a decree dated 27 July 1930, by which the  Douanes et  
Régies became part of the  Direction des Finances de l’Indochine. Although undertaken at a 
later date, this administrative re-organization was nonetheless directly linked to the events 
of 1925, and refected a need to achieve greater control over the fnancial aspects of the 
activities  of  the  Opium Regie.  As Philippe Le Failler  remarked,  this  decree effectively 
tolled the knell of the comparative independence of the Douanes & Régies.31
Political repercussions 
In the early thirties, the fasco of 1925 seemed to be passing into oblivion, all the more so 
when,  in  1933,  the  General  Government  decided  not  to  proceed  with  the  civil  action 
against the Compagnie coloniale du Laos. However, in the same year political events brought 
the whole affair once more to the forefront, where it fnally assumed its true dimension as 
a colonial scandal. 
At the beginning of 1933, the member of the Assembly of Cochinchina, Ernest Outrey, 
asked  the  Minister  for  the  Colonies  for  an  explanation  concerning  the  destruction  of  
unusable stocks of opium during the preceding year. More specifcally clarifcation and 
confrmation was requested relating, frst, to stocks of opium bought in Laos for the sum 
of 1,554,903 piastres,32 secondly to the presence of cow dung in adulterated batches, and 
thirdly to the existence of disciplinary measures taken against those responsible for the 
purchases. Preliminary explanations provided in July 1933 by the Governor General to his 
minister, in preparation for a draft reply to Outrey, proved unlikely to reassure the French 
government as to the fnancial implications of the purchasing campaign: Pasquier had to 
acknowledge the destruction of 72,432 kg of raw opium, as well as 3,665 kg of  chandu 
valued “theoretically” at 2 million piastres.33 The opium came mainly from Yunnan and 
was bought by the Opium Regie in 1924 during a purchasing campaign that was even 
more disastrous than the one in Laos the following year.34
Without going into a detailed examination of the correspondence exchanged between 
the  Governor  General  and  the  French  capital,  suffce  it  to  say  that  the  unsatisfactory 
explanations received by the Minister for the Colonies led to mounting tension during 
1934  and  1935.  The  situation  reached  a  crisis  in  February  1935  when  the  Senate’s  
Commission des comptes défnitifs (Defnitive Accounts Committee)  informed the Minister 
for the Colonies of its intention to propose the rejection of the accounts submitted for the 
1927 budget for Indochina. 
Faced with this ultimatum, a wave of panic swept through the Ministry of the Colonies,  
while the General Government of Indochina either failed to comprehend the gravity of the 
situation or played for time for want of a solution. Under these circumstances the irritation 
of  Louis  Rollin  increased  with  each  succeeding  exchange  of  correspondence  with  the 
Governor  General  René  Robin.  On  the  March  9  1935,  the  Minister  for  the  Colonies 
demanded that details be cabled to him concerning disciplinary measures taken against 
those responsible for purchases in 1925, and instructed the General Government to re-
activate legal proceedings against the ex-Maison Saint Germain. The tone hardened further 
in a telegram dated 27 April. The Minister expressed surprise that he had had to wait over  
one month before receiving a completely unsatisfactory reply. The Minister then reiterated 
the conditions that needed to be fulflled in order to unblock the situation: primo, to specify 
what disciplinary action had so far been taken against those civil servants responsible for 
the fasco,  and what  sanctions still  needed to be imposed;  secundo,  to  immediately re-
activate legal proceeding against the supplier.35
The case was reopened against the ex-Maison Saint Germain, but without conviction. The 
acting lawyer for the administration was more or less certain that they would lose the case,  
since  the  only  new  piece  of  evidence  was  hardly  likely  to  reinforce  the  case  for  the 
prosecution as it  concerned the destruction of chests of adulterated opium.36 So far as 
attributing responsibility was concerned, this was the cause of rising tensions between the 
French government and the General Government of Indochina. The latter was forced to 
admit that no disciplinary action whatsoever had been taken, but produced a list of those 
responsible for the 1925 fasco which obviously aimed at minimizing errors committed by 
the Douanes & Régies authorities. In descending order of importance those named were: 1. 
The Superior  Resident  in  Laos  who encouraged purchases  without  ensuring adequate 
measures of control over the indigenous authorities; 2. The indigenous authorities in Laos,  
responsible for verifying the local provenance of the opium; 3. The director of the Douanes 
& Régies, Kircher; 4. Giton, the local inspector at Luang Prabang.37 
Attributing  primary  levels  of  responsibility  had,  until  then,  never  been  seriously 
envisaged either by the Ministry for the Colonies or by the senatorial committee, whose 
inquiries had been mainly based on the report of inspector Tixier dealing exclusively with 
the  department  of  the  Douanes  &  Régies.  The  strategy  adopted  by  the  Indochinese 
authorities was absolutely clear: the Superior Resident in Laos in 1925, Jules Bosc, and the 
indigenous authorities were to be expiatory victims which the General Government had 
decided to surrender to the fury of the metropolitan authorities. As noted by Philippe Le 
Failler  this  maneuver  also  had the  advantage  of  concentrating  attention on  purchases 
carried out in Laos while allotting secondary importance to much greater losses incurred 
through buying opium in Yunnan.38
Bosc had long experience in dealing with the Indochinese civil service. Hardly the man 
to allow himself be accused of wrongdoing, he had no trouble in convincing the Ministry 
that he was not the main person responsible for the 1925 fasco.39 The former Superior 
Resident did admit to requesting an increase in the buying price so that it corresponded to 
the real value of the local opium, but such a request could not be viewed as a constraint 
imposed on the director of the Douanes & Régies who was the sole authority competent to 
fx the price paid to both producers and accredited buyers. In actual fact, the price that was  
fnally fxed, 20 piastres per kilo, did not comply with Bosc's request (30 piastres), since it 
was lower than the value of the local opium. 
In  addition,  Bosc  made  an  interesting  remark  that  highlighted  the  dysfunctional 
organization of the department of the Douanes & Régies: 
I clearly remember that on several occasions, during the opium purchasing campaigns, I  
drew  the  attention  of  Mr  Kircher  to  the  advisability  of  temporarily  employing  a 
qualifed agent from the [opium] distillery in Saigon, who, using a simple tool, would 
have  been  able  to  inspect  and  check  the  consignments  of  opium  when  they  were 
delivered to the Opium Regie. But he never acted on my suggestion.40
This statement was decisive. On one hand, it clearly showed Kircher's incompetence, 
and on the other, it underlined the inability of the Douanes & Régies authorities to enforce 
strict quality-control measures of the drug they were purchasing. What is more, Bosc made 
another  comment  that  later  served  to  weaken  the  accusations  made  against  him:  it  
appeared that  since  the  fraud was discovered in  September  1925  and until  the  recent 
accusations  leveled  against  him  by  the  Governor  General,  neither  the  law,  nor  the 
department of the Douanes & Régies, nor the General Government had approached him for 
information or explanations concerning the incriminating events. 
The political  epilogue to  the 1925 scandal  was played out  in  France ten years later 
during the end-of-year meeting of the Senate. One after the other the rapporteur for the 
Commission des comptes défnitifs, Maurice Hervey, and the Minister for the Colonies, Louis 
Rollin, succeeded each other in criticizing the serious acts of negligence committed during 
the opium purchasing campaigns. While accusations against Bosc were dropped, criticism 
concentrated on the degree of responsibility attributable to Kircher. Hervey maintained 
that purchase in Laos were made “under the most unimaginable conditions”, and that the 
provisions of opium constituted in Treasury accounts had been “exaggerated beyond all 
belief” by the director of the Douanes & Régies. He was therefore “held entirely responsible 
for  the  losses  incurred”  on  that  occasion.41 In  other  words,  the  Senate  validated  the 
conclusions of the Tixier report. 
The Minister for the Colonies, Louis Rollin, also denounced the part played by Kircher, 
at  the  same  time  exaggerating  the  circumstances  with  a  view  to  denouncing  the 
Indochinese habits and customs. His references to the investigating magistrate at Luang 
Prabang were heavy with insinuations that called into question the probity of his inquiry:  
for example, “It is not for me to judge the role played by certain magistrates, I can have my 
own opinion,  but  I  am not  allowed to  express  it  here”.  Or,  “It  is  really  frustrating to  
observe a supplier deliver defective goods and then, for reasons unknown to me, the legal 
case is dismissed”. Rollin then went beyond the scope of the inquiry concerning opium 
purchasing campaigns to deliver a full scale attack against corrupt practices in Indochina: 
This affair is all the more disquieting in that it reveals a demoralized state, a lack of 
moral fbre in our Indochinese colony [...]. This demoralized state has developed, or at 
least been considerably aggravated, by an easy period of prosperity, or rather pseudo-
prosperity  [...].  Out  there,  even  more  than  here,  at  that  time,  money  governed 
everything.  Everything  was  easy  going,  lax,  with  dubious  friendships,  indulgence 
bordering on connivance.42
Rollin was forced to engage in a diffcult rhetorical balancing act. He had to concur with 
the mood of indignation in the Senate with regard to poor governance in the colony. But he 
also needed to prove his willingness to take concrete steps to reform Indochinese practices. 
But, so far as the 1925 scandal was concerned, the Minister was hardly able to produce any 
convincing evidence for the senators. Since Bosc had been exonerated, then attention could  
concentrate on Kircher; but as no disciplinary action had been taken against him before he 
retired  from  service,  then  incriminating  him  at  this  stage  could  only  result  in  moral 
reprobation. Even the decision of the disciplinary commission that met in 1935 to give a 
ruling  on  the  role  played  by  the  local  inspector  at  Luang  Prabang  provided  no  real 
satisfaction, since it pronounced unanimously against sanctions while at  the same time 
recognizing that  “grave negligence” had occurred.  As for  the  pending civil  procedure 
everyone agreed that it was doomed to failure. 
Rollin's  performance  before  the  senate  was in  fact  purely  rhetorical  because,  before 
hearing his evidence, the senatorial committee had already decided to accept the budget 
for Indochina subject to one condition which senator Hervey recalled during the meeting 
on 5 December 1935:  the Minister  was required to produce proof that  the bulk of  the 
money  spent  in  Laos  had  not  fallen  into  the  hands  of  “individuals  designated  as 
middlemen, a description which appeared to us to be a euphemism”.43 What sort of proof 
could a Minister for the Colonies produce that would provide convincing evidence that 
public money had not flled smugglers’ pockets? In actual fact none, unless it was a note 
from  the  General  Government  that  contained  random  calculations  based  on  false 
reasoning: 
The sum of 455,576 piastres is composed as follows: 414,160 paid to local producers, 
41,416 paid to the Maison Saint Germain responsible for remunerating their indigenous 
middlemen.  On  this  occasion  the  major  part  of  the  money  was  therefore  paid  to 
indigenous  people.  This  information,  and  the  fact  that  the  purchases  of  opium 
contributed to pacifying an otherwise restless population [Hmong and Yao] in no way 
detracts from the gravity of the loss.44
The calculation of the sum paid to the Maison Saint Germain was correct. But the amount 
paid to the indigenous producers failed to take into account the foreign origin of most of 
the  opium ultimately  delivered  to  the  Opium Regie.  Such  a  sophism was  unlikely  to 
convince anyone who had read the Tixier report. Moreover, all those who were familiar 
with the events knew perfectly well that the smugglers and their accomplices, who were 
offcially  accredited  by  the  Douanes  &  Régies,  were  the  real  profteers  of  the  opium 
purchasing  campaigns  in  Laos.  However,  the  senators  clearly  had  no  intention  of 
proceeding with this trial of strength with the Minister for the C olonies by demanding to 
see proof that he was obviously unable to produce. 
The  Senate  therefore  tacitly  accepted  the  conclusions  of  the  Tixier  report,  thereby 
adding a political dimension to the serious internal dysfunctions of the Indochinese civil 
service.  The scandal  did not create much interest  among the general  public.  Although 
debates in the Senate and statements made by the Minister for the Colonies were reported 
in the French press,  they were overshadowed by other matters,  such as debates in the 
Chamber of Deputies about the Ligues and by the war in Ethiopia.45
Discussion and conclusion 
In spite of civil service inquiries, and numerous reports drawn up between 1925 and 
1935,  signifcant  questions  remain  unanswered  concerning  two of  the  most  important  
aspects of the purchasing campaign: the smuggling network and the adulteration of the 
drug delivered to the Opium Regie. 
The Indochinese civil service clearly had no intention of providing information relating 
to the vast smuggling organization that operated under cover of the opium purchasing 
campaign in Laos. Both internal and judicial inquiries carefully avoided any reference to 
such activities, whilst Tixier was hampered by the fact that he was restricted to conducting 
a simple audit of the Douanes & Régies. By using information from other sources, we can 
nevertheless  briefy  summarize  this  chapter  of  the  campaign  that  was  intentionally 
overlooked, in the following way. 
Men working for the tiao fa (prince) of Xieng Toung in the Shan States,46 or Yunnanese 
caravaneers established  in  Panglong  gathered  the  Burmese  opium  which  was  then 
transported to the region of the Tang Ho rapids, on the Upper Mekong, where it was sold  
to accredited  sous-acheteurs.47 Although we do not know the selling price at the Laotian 
frontier, we can nevertheless make a reasonable guess that it was less than 15 piastres per 
kilo.48 Consequently the actual proft realized by the sous-acheteurs was therefore not 0.50 
piastre  per  kilo,  as  stated by judge Martin,  but  more than 4 piastres,  and it  increased 
further due to the drug being fraudulently weighted by the addition of a wide selection of  
other substances. 
The fraud had not been diffcult to organize since the participants in the transactions 
had previously established offcial trading relations during the First World War. In 1914 
local  reports  show  that  the  Opium  Regie  bought  9  tonnes  of  Burmese  opium  from 
indigenous merchants in Luang Prabang.49
The Burmese opium was loaded into pirogues and transported to Luang Prabang where 
it was sold as Laotian opium in connivance with the indigenous authorities.50 In the royal 
town and at the bureau des Douanes & Régies, it was common knowledge that the greater 
part of the opium unloaded at Luang Prabang was of foreign origin, since the quantities 
delivered greatly exceeded the local production capacity of Laos. Civil service hypocrisy 
raises the question as to the real motives of the  Douanes & Régies authorities. Did they 
knowingly acquire opium from the Shan States under cover of campaigns for the purchase  
of the locally produced drug? It is a plausible hypothesis. On the one hand, because the 
Opium Regie had previously bought opium directly from the Shan States, so that it was, in 
effect,  a  practice  that  was allowed to  continue,  but  in  a  new context,  due to  political  
imposed by the Governor General in 1915. On the other hand, the Opium Regie made no 
attempt to take necessary measures to suppress the smuggling trade that had developed 
form the beginning of the twenties.
However,  it  does  seem  that  in  this  case  the  most  plausible  explanation  must  be 
bureaucratic routine coupled with inertia. The original, low price of 15 piastres  per kilo  
fxed by Kircher, certainly did not indicate any clear intention to attract a huge infux of 
the drug from the Shan States.  The later  price  increase to  20  piastres,  decided by the  
interim head of the  Douanes & Régies, proved to be a bad bureaucratic compromise that 
failed to satisfy the Superior Resident of Laos (who had proposed 30 piastres), and was 
hardly compatible  with the political  imperatives imposed by the Governor General  in 
1915. The apathy shown by Kircher, when he once again took up his post as head of the  
Douanes & Régies, and was faced with a request for 400,000 piastres to pay for massive 
deliveries of smuggled opium, seems to denote more a disinterest in his work rather than a 
conscious intention to encourage the purchase of such quantities of the drug from the Shan 
States. 
More  specifcally,  the inertia  of  Kircher  can be  traced to a  disinterest,  bordering on 
culpable  indifference,  towards  implementing  the  politically  motivated  procedures 
imposed on his  department.  This  was exemplifed clearly by the laxity  of  precautions 
taken to check the quality of the opium delivered at Luang Prabang. This, in fact, was the 
real  scandal  of  the  1925  campaign,  which  would  have  been  so  easy  to  avoid  had  an 
experienced employee been delegated to Luang Prabang to ensure effcient quality control 
during the peak of the purchasing period.51 Instead, due to the combined incompetence of 
the French supplier and the local inspector of the  Douanes & Régies, it was not until the 
consignments reached Saigon that the full gravity of the fraud became apparent. 
An examination of  the conditions that facilitated the organization of  one fraud (the 
adulteration  of  the  opium) within another  (the  operation of  a  smuggling ring)  clearly 
defnes those responsible at each stage. The obvious culprits were the indigenous  sous-
acheteurs of the  Maison Saint Germain.  Although it is quite possible that they may have 
overlooked evidence of the addition of fruit juice to the raw opium, it is inconceivable that  
they could have ignored the presence of considerable quantities of gravel or excrement. 
The most serious adulteration almost certainly took place during the fnal stages of the  
buying process,52 once the sous-acheteurs were fully convinced of both the incompetence of 
the French involved in the transactions, and of the ineffciency of the quality controls.53
Although the sous-acheteurs may have been operationally responsible for the fraud, they 
were not necessarily the brain behind the whole organization. Bosc suggested this when he 
wrote that the “moral standards” of the sous-acheteurs had been guaranteed by the senam 
(king's council).54 Whilst king Sisvangvong, known to be an “enemy of opium”,55 was 
above all suspicion, this was not the case for the mandarins of the royal town, who had for 
long been suspected of undercover smuggling activities.56 Nevertheless, none of them had 
ever been named in offcial reports that simply referred to them as the “Laotians of Luang 
Prabang” who were involved in opium smuggling outside the kingdom, especially in the 
Upper Mekong province.57 Working in partnership with Laotian, Burmese and Chinese 
merchants, the mandarins and prominent citizens worked discretely in their own interest  
and  against  that  of  the  colonial  power,  thus  undermining  all  efforts  of  the  French 
authorities to eliminate the illegal opium trade. 
The opium purchasing campaign of 1925 constituted one of those key elements that 
reveal latent realities diffcult to perceive in other circumstances. To begin with, as Philippe 
Le Failler noted, it made visible the mechanisms at work in trading operations that are 
usually  “kept  secret”  and  are  very  diffcult  to  elucidate  from other  sources.58 It  also 
revealed the limited territorial infuence exercised at that time by the colonial power in 
mountainous  regions;  the  French  were  effectively  prevented  from  purchasing  opium 
directly  from producers  at  source,  and rendered  powerless  in  disbanding the  massive 
smuggling  operations  that  undermined  the  political  objective  of  the  purchasing 
campaigns. Finally, it demonstrated the working of a bureaucratic system that, in reality,  
not only failed to achieve the pretensions of effciency that justifed the establishment of 
the colonial  power,  but,  in addition,  did not  correspond to a  simplistic  vision of  total  
domination of a society encased in a straitjacket depriving it of any room to maneuver. It 
was the French who set up the market conditions to which they themselves fell victim, 
since their bureaucratic management strategies were outwitted by the tactics of different 
sectors of the indigenous society that knew only too well how to seize to their advantage 
the opportunities presented by the poor running of the colonial civil service. Bureaucratic 
routine and inertia, ineptitude at a local level, and incompetence in the management of the 
purchasing  campaigns  by  the  head  of  the  Douanes  &  Régies conspired  to  create  the 
conditions  for  fraud  that  were  doubly  scandalous  for  a  colonial  power;  frstly,  they 
engendered heavy fnancial losses, and, secondly, any French who were involved either 
closely or more distantly became the object of ridicule. 
The colonial civil service learnt its lesson. At the same time as the 1925 scandal was 
being debated in the Senate, opium purchasing campaigns on a grand scale were once 
again being organized, but this time every precaution was taken to avoid a repetition of  
the fasco endured 10 years' previously. Nevertheless, it was not until the Second World 
War that the Douanes & Régies achieved a fully effcient purchasing policy, namely, buying 
at source, equipping its collecting centers with the indispensable tools for carrying out 
preliminary  tests  on  the  raw opium,  working  closely  with  the  Hmong  chiefs,  and  in 
adapting  both  prices  and  practices  (including  cases  where  barter  was  appropriate)  to 
trading conditions operating in mountainous regions.59
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